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*282 I. Introduction
In 2010, the New Zealand Government began a process to reform and strengthen the regulation of cartels, with a focus on
criminalising hard core cartels. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has condemned
hard cartels as the "most egregious violations of competition law" and recommended criminal sanctions. 1  The New
Zealand Court of Appeal has said that "[c]artel conduct has a damaging impact upon society: it results in high prices,
misallocation of resources, and corrodes the incentive for firms to innovate." 2
The New Zealand cartel reform process began with a 2010 Discussion Document on cartel criminalisation. 3  This was
followed by an Exposure Draft Bill in 2011 4  and the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill (the
Cartel Bill) was introduced into the New Zealand Parliament in October 2011. 5  The Cartel Bill was designed to improve
detection and deterrence of cartel conduct. 6  The criminalisation of cartels was intended to increase international co-
operation as a number of New Zealand’s trading partners had made legal provision for criminal sanctions for cartel
conduct, and this was recommended by the OECD as best practice. 7  It was also intended to advance the single economic
market with Australia, as Australia had criminalised cartels relatively recently in 2009. 8  The New Zealand proposal
was however significantly different from the Australian regime. 9  The Commerce Commission 10  view was that the
introduction of the criminal regime would also provide important investigative and enforcement benefits to New Zealand,
including enabling extradition of offenders to New Zealand, the ability to share information and co-operate with
equivalent overseas agencies and access to surveillance and interception powers. 11
The Cartel Bill as initially introduced replaced the existing per se rule on price-fixing with a broader cartel provision,
and introduced criminal sanctions for cartel conduct, among other things. The Cartel Bill progressed slowly through
the parliamentary process; it was reported back from the Select Committee in 2013 and the second reading was in 2014.
Then on 8 December 2015 the Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs announced that criminalisation of cartel
conduct would not proceed and criminal sanctions for cartel behaviour would be removed from the Bill. 12  The Minister
said that the Government was concerned that there was a significant risk that criminalisation would "have a chilling
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effect on pro-competitive behaviour between companies". 13  This was a major change in policy, since criminalisation
was the major driver for the cartel reform. It seems likely that criminalisation will return to a future legislative agenda,
but it will not proceed at this time. *283 14
This article does not seek to revisit questions around the desirability or otherwise of criminalisation. 15  Rather, it is
an assessment of what remains of the cartel reforms in the proposed New Zealand legislation, and the structure of the
proposed new civil regime for cartel regulation once criminal liability is removed. The decision not to proceed with
criminalisation, but to proceed with the Cartel Bill, now focuses attention on the nature and effect of the changes in the
absence of criminalisation. The article argues that the proposal to introduce criminal sanctions has substantially shaped
the cartel reform, and that the proposed regime evidences a concern to avoid "false positives" under the per se rule in
order to avoid imposing criminal sanctions for conduct that is undeserving. This is a laudable goal, but there is now a
potential risk that this concern may have weakened the civil regime, and especially the per se rule for cartel conduct, so
that it will be for the Commerce Commission and the courts to interpret the new law to ensure that cartel conduct is
detected, actioned appropriately, and consequently deterred.
II. Cartel prohibition: the existing law
The Cartel Bill will repeal the existing price fixing provision in s.30, which operates as a per se prohibition on price fixing.
The existing provision in s.30 deems a price-fixing contract, arrangement or understanding between competitors to have
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market for the purposes of s.27. Section 27
prohibits contracts, arrangement or understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening
competition in a market. This per se prohibition on price-fixing covers a wide range of collusive conduct, so long as it
has the purpose, effect or likely effect of
"fixing, controlling, or maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling, or maintaining, of the price for goods or
services, or any discount, allowance, rebate, or credit in relation to goods or services". 16
"Price" is broadly defined, 17  and this is further broadened by the inclusion of "discount, allowance, rebate or credit"
in the provision. Any agreement that has the effect or likely effect of price-fixing is covered, so that market allocation
agreements, output agreements and collusive tendering are all potentially covered. 18  The existing per se rule is therefore
quite broad.
There are exemptions from s.30 for joint ventures, 19  for recommendations as to price in some circumstances, 20  and for
some joint buying and promotion arrangements. 21  These exemptions are relatively narrow. The joint venture exception
applies to structural joint ventures only and has been subject to criticism as not covering some forms of pro-competitive
activity. 22  The effect of these exemptions is that these activities are not covered by the deeming provision but are still
subject to the substantial lessening of competition test in s.27. This means that any conduct that is not found to be per se
prohibited can still be a contravention if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.
It is of course well-recognised that it is considerably more difficult and more costly to establish liability under a rule
of reason test. 23
Under the existing regime, conduct subject to s.30 may be authorised. 24  The test for authorisation is the public benefit
test, whereby the conduct may be authorised if the Commerce Commission is satisfied that the conduct 25 :
"will in all the circumstances result, or be likely to result, in a benefit to the public which would outweigh the lessening
in competition that would result, or would be likely to result or is deemed to result therefrom."
Cartel regulation in New Zealand: undermining the per se rule?, E.C.L.R. 2016, 37(7),...
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. 3
Authorisations are however rarely sought, reportedly because the process is lengthy, difficult, and costly, with uncertain
outcomes. Firms also have confidentiality concerns. *284 26
III. The proposed cartel regime
The Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Bill 27  replaces s.30 and exemptions 28  with a new provision that prohibits
entering into a contract or arrangement or arriving at an understanding that contains a cartel provision. Giving effect
to a cartel provision is also prohibited. "Cartel provision" is defined in the Cartel Bill as 29 :
 (1)
"A cartel provision is a provision, contained in a contract, arrangement, or understanding, that has the purpose, effect, or
likely effect of 1 or more of the following in relation to the 30 supply or acquisition of goods or services in New Zealand:
 (a)
price fixing:
 (b)
restricting output:
 (c)
market allocating."
Each category of prohibited conduct is then separately defined. "Price fixing" 30
"means, as between the parties to a contract, arrangement, or understanding, fixing, controlling, or maintaining, or
providing for the fixing, controlling, or maintaining of,—
 (a)
the price for goods or services that any 2 or more parties to the contract, arrangement, or understanding supply or
acquire in competition with each other; or
 (b)
any discount, allowance, rebate, or credit in relation to goods or services that any 2 or more parties to the contract,
arrangement, or understanding supply or acquire in competition with each other."
"Restricting output" 31
"means preventing, restricting, or limiting, or providing for the prevention, restriction, or limitation of,—
 (a)
the production or likely production by any party to a contract, arrangement, or understanding of goods that any 2 or
more of the parties to the contract, arrangement, or understanding supply or acquire in competition with each other; or
 (b)
the capacity or likely capacity of any party to a contract, arrangement, or understanding to supply services that any 2
or more parties to the contract, arrangement, or understanding supply or acquire in competition with each other; or
 (c)
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the supply or likely supply of goods or services that any 2 or more parties to a contract, arrangement, or understanding
supply in competition with each other; or
 (d)
the acquisition or likely acquisition of goods or services that any 2 or more parties to a contract, arrangement, or
understanding acquire in competition with each other."
"Market allocating" 32
"means allocating between any 2 or more parties to a contract, arrangement, or understanding, or providing for such
an allocation of, either or both of the following:
 (a)
the persons or classes of persons to or from whom the parties supply or acquire goods or services in competition with
each other:
 (b)
the geographic areas in which the parties supply or acquire goods or services in competition with each other."
This is a significant change to the existing cartel legislation. It continues the per se prohibition on price-fixing in s.30,
but extends it explicitly to restricting output and market allocation. The Cartel Bill provides a much fuller explanation
of what constitutes prohibited cartel conduct, reflecting the definition used by the OECD. 33  The new definition extends
beyond price fixing to expressly include output restrictions and market allocation agreements, although as defined in the
current s.30 many of these would have been caught as price fixing agreements anyway. Nevertheless, the new provision
has the potential to be broader than the existing per se prohibitions in ss.30 and s.29. 34  It means that cartel provisions as
defined are per se unlawful without a substantial lessening of competition test, unless they are covered by an exemption
or subject to a clearance or authorisation. *285
The Commerce Commission has produced draft Competitor Collaboration Guidelines in preparation for the new
legislation. 35  These were produced before the government decision to remove criminal provisions from the cartel bill,
and they will inevitably change before the bill comes into force. They are nevertheless relevant to consideration of the
bill. In an introduction to the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, the Chair of the Commerce Commission expresses
the view that it is reasonable to have exemptions to mitigate any overreach, but that equally the exemptions should not
be interpreted in a way that undermines the fundamental per se nature of the cartel prohibition. 36
The New Zealand cartels bill also provides for very important new exemptions to liability under s.30. The new exemptions
replace the existing, narrower, exemptions to s.30. There is an exemption for vertical supply contracts, 37  which provides
for an exemption to s.30 for contracts between suppliers of goods or services and customers if the cartel provision relates
to supply or likely supply of goods or services or to the maximum price at which the customer may resupply the goods
or services, and does not have the dominant purpose of lessening competition. This provision exempts vertical supply
contracts that might otherwise be caught by the per se prohibition. It includes an exemption for maximum resale prices,
which the Select Committee believed were pro-competitive. 38
The Cartel Bill also provides for an exemption for joint buying and promotion agreements, replacing the existing
exemption with a broader exemption. 39  It provides for an exemption from price fixing for agreements on price in relation
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to goods or services collectively acquired, or joint advertising of price, or collective negotiation of price followed by
individual purchasing.
The most important exception is the new exemption for collaborative activity, included to mitigate any risk that s.30
may capture pro-competitive conduct. 40  This exception replaces the existing joint venture exception, but is much wider.
Under the proposed collaborative activity exemption, parties to a contract, arrangement or understanding that contains
a cartel provision are exempt from s.30 if at the time of entering into the contract, arrangement or understanding they are:
 (i)
"involved in a collaborative activity and
 (i)
(ii) the cartel provision is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the collaborative activity." 41
"Collaborative activity" in this context is defined as follows 42 :
"In this Act, collaborative activity means an enterprise, venture, or other activity, in trade, that—
 (a)
is carried on in co-operation by 2 or more persons; and
 (b)
is not carried on for the dominant purpose of lessening competition between any 2 or more of the parties."
This definition of collaborative activity therefore requires two main elements. The first is carrying on an enterprise,
venture, or other activity in trade, in co-operation. One commentator has suggested that this could apply to
"consortia, partnerships, strategic alliances, syndicated lending arrangements, lender work-out arrangements for
insolvent borrowers, litigation settlement agreements, franchisors and franchisees under a franchise agreement and other
kinds of collaborative activity between competitors." 43
It has also been suggested that it would extend to such activities as
"arrangements for cost sharing and capacity allocation on shared infrastructure, joint buying (buyers clubs), research
and development joint ventures, and committees for establishing technology standards." 44
The Commerce Commission Competitor Collaboration Guidelines interpretation is that the parties must be carrying on
a commercial activity in co-operation, and that the parties must be "combining their businesses, assets or operations
in some way in a commercial activity, or otherwise operating a commercial activity jointly". 45  The Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines also state that
"the parties should be able to identify and to explain how they intend to combine their businesses, assets or operations
in a commercial activity, or otherwise operate in a commercial activity jointly". *286 46
A simple agreement between competitors without the carrying on in co-operation element will not therefore be sufficient
on the Commerce Commission’s interpretation.
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The second element of the collaborative activity definition requires that the activity is not carried on for the dominant
purpose of lessening competition between any two or more of the parties. The requirement here is that it not be for the
dominant purpose of lessening competition. Any effect or likely effect of lessening competition is not a consideration.
There is therefore no requirement that a defendant show that the collaborative activity will not have the effect or likely
effect of lessening competition. Purpose is the only relevant consideration in applying this aspect of the exemption.
On one view this is appropriate as s.27 already includes a substantial lessening competition test to which the conduct
would be subject if the collaborative activity exemption applies. 47  However on another view, the onus in establishing
the exemption is on the defendant, whereas under s.27 the onus will be on the plaintiff, an arguably significant difference
in the context of a detailed consideration of the application of the test.
In relation to determining purpose, the Commerce Commission Competitor Collaboration Guidelines refer to dominant
purpose as the "prevailing objective" of the collaborative activity. 48  The Commerce Commission takes the view that
there is no bright line determining when an objective is the dominant objective. 49  The test for purpose is primarily
objective, and the bill provides that the purpose may be inferred from the conduct of any relevant person or from any
other relevant circumstance. 50
Under s.30, the parties must not only establish a collaborative activity, but must also show that the cartel provision is
reasonably necessary for the purpose of the collaborative activity. 51  The test is objective 52  and the provision requires
that it be assessed at the time of entering into the contract, arrangement or understanding. 53  The Commerce Commission
in its Competitor Collaboration Guidelines notes that "reasonably necessary" does not require that the cartel provision be
essential, and a "but for" test will not apply. 54  A determination of "reasonably necessary" will require consideration of
why the parties have included the cartel provision, consideration of the scope of the provision, and an assessment of other
available options. 55  In developing the new provision, consideration was given to introducing an ancillary restraints
defence based on the US jurisprudence. However this option was rejected because of potential uncertainty of scope. 56
The preferred option of a collaborative activity exemption was intended to be "sufficiently broad to cover both joint
ventures and ancillary restraints." 57  In relation to ancillary restraints it has however been suggested that, although the
inquiry is as to whether the provision is "reasonably necessary" rather than "necessary" or "essential", the Commission
is likely to draw on US, Canadian and European jurisprudence on the doctrine of ancillary restraints in making these
assessments. 58
The Cartel Bill contains a new provision reversing the onus of proof in the civil regime where the defendant claims an
exemption under ss.31, 32 or 33. In that situation, it will be for the defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities
that the relevant exemption applies. 59  This would not have applied to the previously proposed criminal offence. This
reversal of onus seems appropriate in a civil context and is consistent with other areas of civil liability where the defendant
has the onus of proving that a defence applies. The draft Commerce Commission Competitor Collaboration Guidelines
require that parties must be able to explain why they are collaborating, and must be able to explain that the dominant
purpose of their activity is benign or pro-competitive, and that if they cannot persuasively do so, it is highly likely that
the Commission or court will infer that the dominant purpose is to lessen competition between the parties. 60  The new
provision reversing the onus, as interpreted by the Commerce Commission, will go some way to ensuring that the courts
or Commission will consider any evidence of a pro-competitive purpose of the collaboration.
Authorisations remain available under the Cartel Bill for s.30 conduct, and the test remains a public benefit test. 61
Clearances will also now be made available for cartel provisions under a new clearance regime. *287  Clearances
will be available if the Commerce Commission is satisfied that the parties are or will be involved in a collaborative
activity and the cartel provision is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the collaborative activity, and that the
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contract, arrangement or understanding will not have or would not be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening
competition in a market. 62
IV. Does the Cartel Bill weaken the civil regime?
The Cartel Bill is structured so that it contains a new, broader, definition of cartel conduct, and then broader exceptions.
It is arguable that the new definition of cartel conduct is not dramatically broader than the existing price-fixing rule, which
already encompasses at least some agreements restricting output and market allocation. The exceptions are however
clearly broader.
The exception for collaborative activity is a significant departure from the previous exceptions, and is designed to
clearly exempt pro-competitive activity, providing greater certainty. 63  The new exception has been acclaimed by at
least one major commentator as a model for other jurisdictions, although this was in the context of the then-proposed
criminalisation reform. 64  The exemption as drafted has the benefit of being wider than the previous joint venture
exception, and would cover any kind of co-operative activity so long as it was not for the dominant purpose of lessening
competition. It is intended to avoid chilling potentially pro-competitive and innovative business activity, especially when
criminal sanctions are available, but it is intended that it would not exempt true cartel activity from the per se ban. As
such, it is designed to prevent overreach and capture of beneficial conduct under the per se prohibition on cartels.
It is, however, arguable that the concern about overreach has been excessive. In the New Zealand context, most cases
are brought by the Commerce Commission after an investigation, few cases are brought by private plaintiffs challenging
rivals. 65  The Commerce Commission uses established published enforcement criteria in deciding whether to commence
or continue enforcement action, the criteria being the extent of the detriment, the seriousness of the conduct, and the
public interest. 66  Legislative overreach and false positives might be regarded as a greater risk in the context of criminal
offences, and the policy papers produced in the reform process suggest that providing certainty for business by creating
a bright line between conduct which is legal and that which was illegal was a major concern in designing a criminal
offence. 67  Criminal offences have now been removed from the legislation. This raises the question as to whether the
exemptions provided in the bill as part of a criminalisation reform will prove to have weakened the civil law regime
prohibiting cartel conduct.
The new broad exemption for collaborative activity may weaken cartel regulation. In the Select Committee stage, the
Commerce Commission supported the proposed exemption for collaborative activity, saying that it was consistent with
other jurisdictions with per se criminal price-fixing prohibitions, where there are exemptions for collaboration between
competitors that is shown to be pro-competitive and efficiency-enhancing. 68  However, the Commerce Commission
submitted that amendments were needed to the proposed s.31, requiring the Commerce Commission and the courts
to consider the pro-competitive purpose of the collaboration and any efficiency likely to be produced. 69  The Select
Committee did not act on the Commerce Commission’s recommendations.
The question whether the current civil regime was "watered down" by the exemptions in the cartel bill was raised by
one Member of Parliament in the Select Committee hearing. 70  In its response, the Commerce Commission said that in
its view the existing civil prohibition would not be weakened, provided the amendments it suggested were made. The
Commerce Commission submitted that 71 :
"While the collaborative activity exemption is designed to limit false positives (excluding conduct from the exemption
that is in fact pro-competitive), as currently drafted it risks creating false negatives (exempting conduct that is in fact
anti-competitive). *288  "
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The Commerce Commission’s view was that the new s.31 should be amended to require the courts and the Commission
to consider the pro-competitive purpose of the collaboration and any efficiencies likely to be produced as a result. 72
This approach would have been consistent with the US Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (US
Guidelines) which explicitly require consideration of procompetitive benefits and efficiencies. 73  The US Guidelines
provide an analytical framework for evaluating agreements among competitors. In relation to agreements that are per
se illegal, the US Guidelines provide that agreements that "always or almost always tend to raise price or reduce output
are per se illegal" so that courts will not inquire into "claimed business purposes, anticompetitive harms, procompetitive
benefits, or overall competitive effects". 74  Participants in hard-core cartel agreements are prosecuted criminally. 75
However, the US competition agencies will analyse some prima facie per se agreements under a rule of reason analysis,
if "participants in an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity enter into an agreement that is reasonably
related to the integration and reasonably necessary to achieve its procompetitive benefits". 76  The US Guidelines further
provide that the "integration must be of a type that plausibly would generate procompetitive benefits cognizable under
[an] efficiencies analysis". The US Guidelines are clear that mere co-ordination of decisions on price, output, customers,
territories, and the like is not integration, and cost savings without integration are not enough to avoid the per se rule.
The Select Committee did not make the amendment suggested by the Commerce Commission, and there is now no
requirement in the cartels bill that the parties show pro-competitive purpose and/or efficiencies resulting. However, the
explanatory material accompanying the exposure draft of the cartel bill clearly stated that the exemption for collaborative
activity was "intended to make it clear that the Act encourages pro-competitive, innovative and efficiency-enhancing
activities." 77  The explanatory material also made clear that consideration had been given to requiring "efficiency-
enhancing integration" as in the US regime, but that option had been rejected. 78  However, it was noted that flexibility
was built into the US Guidelines, which might suggest that, in the New Zealand context, efficiency enhancing integration
had only been rejected as a statutory test. It is not now to be a statutory requirement, but efficiencies will be relevant
considerations. Integration will, however, not be required to show that the cartel provision is "reasonably necessary".
The Cartel Bill as it stands now contains an important exemption to the per se rule for cartel conduct offering broad
protection in cases of collaborative activity. The per se rule will continue to apply for simple (or "naked") agreements
setting a minimum price or restricting output. However, the situation will be more complex where there is even the
possibility of the collaborative activity exemption applying. The exemption is not intended to cover sham collaborations,
and it is likely that such constructs will be found to either contravene s.30 or s.27 once the case goes to court.
However, investigations of cartel conduct will need to consider the possible application of the exceptions, especially
the collaborative activity exception, in a broad range of fact situations. Both parties to potential litigation will need to
consider not only whether there is an agreement that is a cartel provision covered by the per se rule as defined, but also
whether exemptions apply, particularly those for collaborative activity. Consideration will need to be given to whether
parties to a cartel provision are involved in an enterprise, venture, or other activity, in trade that is carried on in co-
operation by two or more persons, whether it is carried on for the dominant purpose of lessening competition between any
two or more of the parties, and whether the cartel provision is reasonably necessary for the purpose of the collaborative
activity. The defendant will need to prove the dominant purpose element, but will not need to prove that the cartel
provision does not have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in order to get the benefit of the
collaborative activity exemption.
The inquiry into the application of the collaborative activity exemption will require quite detailed consideration that
takes it beyond pure per se consideration and introduces elements of a rule of reason analysis, potentially adding to the
costs of litigation. Of course, if it is found that s.30 is not contravened, then there is still the potential for a full rule of
reason analysis in s.27. This suggests that there is a real possibility that the changes to the civil regime will in fact create
a weaker per se rule for cartel conduct, and it will now be for the Commission and the courts to interpret the law so as
to avoid false negatives. *289
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V. Conclusion
Now that the criminal sanctions have been removed, hard core cartel conduct such as agreements that raise price or
restrict output will be subject only to the new civil law cartel regime in ss.30–33. The definition of cartel conduct is
somewhat broader than the existing per se price fixing rule, and the exceptions are significantly broader. In the event
that a cartel provision is exempted under one of the exceptions, the effect is not necessarily that it escapes scrutiny. It
will still be subject to the s.27 rule of reason test.
The question remains as to what extent the per se prohibition in New Zealand law will be undermined by this change.
Per se rules mean that conduct can be prohibited without the detailed economic and factual analysis required by a
rule of reason analysis. Per se cases are more likely to be initiated, and much more likely to be successful, than cases
brought under rule of reason provisions. Per se rules are, of course, notoriously unpopular in neoliberal theory, and per
se prohibitions have been progressively narrowed and displaced by rule of reason analysis in the US, even in the core
area of price-fixing, resulting in greater success for defendants. 79  The New Zealand Cartel Bill does not introduce rule of
reason analysis to price fixing and output restrictions, but it opens the door to aspects of that analysis. The New Zealand
Bill began with the objective of strengthening the regulation of hard core cartels. However, it will abolish what remained
of the per se ban on group boycotts in s.29. 80  It will introduce a wider per se ban on hard core cartel conduct, but with
broad exceptions that, when argued, will require detailed analysis more generally seen in rule of reason cases. It remains
to be seen whether this new regime will aid enforcement of anti-cartel rules, but there is certainly room for doubters
to suspect that the project which began as an effort to strengthen the prohibitions on cartel conduct may actually have
weakened them.
Dr Anna Kingsbury
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